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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO
STATE OF IDAHO,
Plaintiff-Respondent,
v.
JOSHUA LEO VESELY,
Defendant-Appellant.
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)
)
)
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)
)
)
)

NO. 45027
ADA COUNTY NO. CR01-16-29926

APPELLANT’S BRIEF

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the Case
A jury found Joshua Leo Vesely guilty of three counts of possession of a controlled
substance with the intent to deliver and one count of misdemeanor possession of a controlled
substance. The district court imposed an aggregate sentence of ten years, with two and one-half
years fixed. Mr. Vesely appeals, arguing the district court abused its discretion by imposing an
excessive sentence.
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Statement of Facts and Course of Proceedings
The State charged Mr. Vesely with four drug offenses: (1) possession of morphine with
the intent to deliver, a felony, in violation of I.C. § 37-2732(a); (2) possession of hydrocodone
with the intent to deliver, a felony, in violation of I.C. § 37-2732(a); (3) possession of
amphetamine with the intent to deliver, a felony, in violation of I.C. § 37-2732(a); and (4)
possession of “bath salts,” a misdemeanor, in violation of I.C. §§ 37-2732(c), -2705(f)(3).
(R., pp.31–32.) Mr. Vesely pled not guilty and exercised his right to a jury trial. (R., pp.42, 79–
86; see generally Tr., p.1, L.1–p.349, L.19.) The jury found Mr. Vesely guilty as charged.
(R., pp.121–24; Tr., p.343, L.7–p.345, L.12.)
At sentencing, the State recommended an aggregate sentence of ten years, with five years
fixed. (Tr., p.354, Ls.15–16.) Mr. Vesely requested the district court sentence him to an
aggregate term of seven to ten years, with two to five years fixed, and either retain jurisdiction or
suspend the sentence and place him on probation. (Tr., p.359, L.16–p.360, L.11.) The district
court sentenced Mr. Vesely to ten years, with two and one-half years fixed, for each count of
possession with the intent to deliver, to be served concurrently. (Tr., p.366, Ls.16–24.) It
sentenced him to 120 days, with 120 days credit for time served, for the misdemeanor.
(Tr., p.366, Ls.20–21; R., p.136.) The district court declined to retain jurisdiction or place Mr.
Vesely on probation. (Tr., p.365, L.20–p.366, L.15.) Mr. Vesely timely appealed from the district
court’s judgment of conviction. (R., pp.135–38, 140–42.)

ISSUE
Did the district court abuse its discretion when it imposed a unified aggregate sentence of ten
years, with two and one-half years fixed, upon Mr. Vesely, following his conviction for three
drug offenses?
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ARGUMENT
The District Court Abused Its Discretion When It Imposed A Unified Aggregate Sentence Of
Ten Years, With Two And One-Half Years Fixed, Upon Mr. Vesely, Following His Conviction
For Three Drug Offenses
“It is well-established that ‘[w]here a sentence is within statutory limits, an appellant has
the burden of showing a clear abuse of discretion on the part of the court imposing the
sentence.’” State v. Pierce, 150 Idaho 1, 5 (2010) (quoting State v. Jackson, 130 Idaho 293, 294
(1997) (alteration in original)). Here, Mr. Vesely’s aggregate sentence does not exceed the
statutory maximum. See I.C. § 37-2732(a)(1)(A) (maximum of life imprisonment). Accordingly,
to show that the sentence imposed was unreasonable, Mr. Vesely “must show that the sentence,
in light of the governing criteria, is excessive under any reasonable view of the facts.” State v.
Strand, 137 Idaho 457, 460 (2002).
“‘Reasonableness’ of a sentence implies that a term of confinement should be tailored to
the purpose for which the sentence is imposed.” State v. Adamcik, 152 Idaho 445, 483 (2012)
(quoting State v. Stevens, 146 Idaho 139, 148 (2008)).
In examining the reasonableness of a sentence, the Court conducts an independent
review of the entire record available to the trial court at sentencing, focusing on
the objectives of criminal punishment: (1) protection of society; (2) deterrence of
the individual and the public; (3) possibility of rehabilitation; and (4) punishment
or retribution for wrongdoing.
Stevens, 146 Idaho at 148. “A sentence is reasonable if it appears necessary to accomplish the
primary objective of protecting society and to achieve any or all of the related goals of
deterrence, rehabilitation, or retribution.” State v. Delling, 152 Idaho 122, 132 (2011).
“The primary purpose of the retained jurisdiction program is to enable the trial court to
gain additional information regarding the defendant’s rehabilitative potential and suitability for
probation.” State v. Jones, 141 Idaho 673, 676 (Ct. App. 2005). “[P]robation is the ultimate
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objective of a defendant who is on retained jurisdiction.” Id. at 677. The district court’s decision
to retain jurisdiction is reviewed for an abuse of discretion. Id. “There can be no abuse of
discretion in a trial court’s refusal to retain jurisdiction if the court already has sufficient
information upon which to conclude that the defendant is not a suitable candidate for probation.”
Id. Similarly, “[t]he choice of probation, among available sentencing alternatives, is committed
to the sound discretion of the trial court . . . .” State v. Landreth, 118 Idaho 613, 615 (Ct. App.
1990).
Mr. Vesely asserts the district court abused its discretion by imposing an excessive
sentence under any reasonable view of the facts. Specifically, he contends the district court
should have sentenced him to a lesser term of imprisonment, retained jurisdiction, or placed him
on probation in light of the mitigating factors, including his many years of sobriety, acceptance
of responsibility, family support, gainful employment, and cancer diagnosis.
Prior to the instant offenses, Mr. Vesely had been sober for fourteen years. (Presentence
Investigation Report (“PSI”), p.10.) He was initially incarcerated in federal prison, but was
released in 2011. (PSI, p.6; Tr., p.355, Ls.10–13.) He was then on supervised probation for five
years. (PSI, p.6.) During this time, Mr. Vesely lived in Minnesota and worked as a welder and
carpenter. (PSI, pp.7, 8–9.) He successfully completed federal probation. (PSI, p.11.) In June of
2016, Mr. Vesely’s stepfather passed away. (PSI, p.6.) Mr. Vesely moved to Boise about eight
months later to be closer to his family in Idaho. (PSI, p.6.) This move to Boise, however, did not
go as planned. (PSI, p.10.) Mr. Vesely started “hanging with the wrong crowd” after he lost his
union job. (PSI, pp.3, 10, 18.) He started using methamphetamine, bath salts, and pain pills. (PSI,
p.3.) With regard to the instant offense, Mr. Vesely explained, “I was arrested with pain pills I
had considered selling, but thankfully I got caught before I could do any more damage to myself
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or sink deeper into other crimes or mistakes.” (PSI, p.3.) He took full responsibility for his
actions. (PSI, p.10.) Mr. Vesely’s long period of sobriety coupled with his acceptance of
responsibility support a lesser sentence. Although Mr. Vesely relapsed, he has shown that he can
succeed on probation due to his past success on federal probation. With steady employment and
a strong support system, Mr. Vesely can get back on track and become a contributing member of
society once again.
Mr. Vesely has the tools to succeed on probation or during a period of retained
jurisdiction. For example, he has a supportive family in Idaho. His stepsister and two nephews
live in Meridian. (PSI, p.6.) He is very close to them. (PSI, p.6.) Mr. Vesely also has prosocial
friends. (PSI, p.6.) In particular, he has two close friends who do not have substance abuse issues
“and are successful adults.” (PSI, p.6.) He could live with them if placed on probation. (PSI, p.6.)
Even with this support network, Mr. Vesely recognized that he had some friends in Idaho with
substance abuse issues, so he was also considering moving back to Minnesota. (PSI, pp.7, 18.)
He did not know anyone who used illegal drugs in Minnesota. (PSI, p.7.) In addition, Mr. Vesely
was motivated to turn his life around. While in custody, he completed a residential drug abuse
program and aftercare. (PSI, p.10.) He also hoped to finish college, participate in additional
substance abuse treatment, and eventually become a chemical dependency counselor himself.
(PSI, pp.8, 11.) Moreover, Mr. Vesely is employable. He is a skilled carpenter and welder. (PSI,
p.9.) He was confident he could find employment upon release. (PSI, p.9.) These factors—family
and friend support, commitment to sobriety, and gainful employment opportunities—all support
a lesser sentence, including probation or a period of retained jurisdiction.
Finally, Mr. Vesely’s serious health issues support a more lenient sentence. In 2001 or
2002, Mr. Vesely was diagnosed with leukemia. (PSI, pp.9, 21.) His leukemia was in remission
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prior to his arrest. (PSI, p.9.) Most recently, he was treated by an oncologist at St. Alphonsus.
(PSI, p.21.) Now incarcerated, Mr. Vesely has been unable to get the necessary medication,
Gleevec. (PSI, p.9.) In fact, at the time of the presentence report, he had not received his
leukemia medication for five months. (PSI, pp.11, 18.) He characterized his situation as
“desperate” and believed his health was failing without the medication. (PSI, pp.9, 11.) For
example, he had chronic fatigue and an ear infection that would not heal. (PSI, p.11.) The Ada
County jail eventually provided Mr. Vesely with a fourteen-day supply of Gleevec just prior to
his sentencing hearing. (Tr., p.358, Ls.8–10.) Nonetheless, Mr. Vesely expressed immense
concern with his medical treatment in prison. (Tr., p.361, L.25–p.362, L.19.) He informed the
district court that he was not in remission anymore. (Tr., p.362, L.1.) Mr. Vesely understood that
he committed crimes and deserved punishment, but maintained that he should not be denied the
proper medication. (Tr., p.262, Ls.4–11, p.363, Ls.19–24.) He wanted to get healthy again.
(Tr., p.363, Ls.19–20.) In light of his cancer diagnosis, along with the other mitigating factors
discussed above, Mr. Vesely asserts the district court abused its discretion by imposing an
excessive sentence.

CONCLUSION
Mr. Vesely respectfully requests that this Court reduce his sentence as it deems
appropriate. Alternatively, he respectfully requests that this Court vacate the district court’s
judgment of conviction and remand this case to the district court for a new sentencing hearing.
DATED this 6th day of November, 2017.

__________/s/_______________
JENNY C. SWINFORD
Deputy State Appellate Public Defender
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